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AUSTRALIAN BOARDING SCHOOL SUPERVISORS: 
A VOLUNTARY POSITION? 
 
This paper aims to examine how Australian boarding supervisors (particularly non-teachers) are 
defined in regards to employment. The practices of Queensland’s School X (real name withheld) are 
used as an example of the difficult issues involved – although whether this case study is repeated 
elsewhere in the industry would take further research. The paper illustrates that the employment of 
boarding supervisors is dealt with at a basic level by a modern award, however its provisions do not 
represent what occurs in practice. If there is no enterprise bargain which improves upon the award, 
two possible explanations are put forward to explain the difference between award conditions and 
practice. The first is that the contract between boarding supervisors may not be one of employment. 
Relevant case law regarding whether a person is an employee or independent contractor is examined, 
and when applied to a typical boarding situation, it is concluded that any contract should be one of 
employment. The second explanation is that there is no legal contract at all between boarding 
supervisors and a school. Drawing on School X’s example where supervisors were classed as 
‘volunteers’, the paper examines what the legal effect of that term might be. It could be seen to be a 
denial of an intention to create legal relations, a critical element in contract formation. Again, 
important cases are analysed on the topic of intention, and applied to a boarding context. It is argued 
that given the objective circumstances of a typical agreement, there is an intention to create legal 
relations. In particular, a little known Queensland case involving the non-employment status of 
boarding supervisors, which may be the cause of the confusion, is critically examined to determine its 
usefulness in answering the issue. Finally, the implications of not classifying boarding supervisors as 
employees are briefly discussed. 
 
 
I  Introduction 
 
Boarding schools are an important part of the educational landscape. In Australia, there are 172 
boarding schools, both government and privately-run. Approximately 23,000 children are enrolled in 
an Australian boarding school.
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The responsibility of boarding schools for developing positive outcomes for children is broader than a 
conventional day school. Not only does a boarding community need to maintain high academic 
achievement, it also needs to fulfil other ‘parenting’ roles, such as ensuring physical exercise takes 
place, emotional development occurs, social skills improve, and values such as tolerance, co-
operation and compassion are appreciated. Boarding schools are trusted to play a very large part in the 
holistic development of a child into a young man or woman. 
 
Given the uniqueness of the industry, it is worth noting that very little research has occurred in the 
area. There is currently an ARC-funded research project underway in Australia aiming to empirically 
examine academic and non-academic outcomes for boarding students.
2
  
 
However, a part of the equation with even less attention is that of the supervisors
3
 who work in 
boarding schools. Undoubtedly the skills and professionalism of these supervisors would be relevant 
in the successful, well-rounded education of a boarding student. 
 
The Australian Boarding Schools Association (ABSA) has acknowledged the importance of quality 
staff in its September 2012 draft ‘National Boarding Standards’ (NBS). 97% of Australian boarding 
schools are members of ABSA
4
, so these standards represent an important step in achieving consistent 
quality in the industry. Of particular interest is the standard relating to ‘Staff Management’, Standard 
15, which states: 
 
15.2 Conditions of employment are made clear to staff before they are employed, including 
details of salary and period of employment. 
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However, as will be discussed below, many boarding supervisors are not paid in the form of a 
“salary”, and some may be denied the status of employment. 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the position of ‘boarding supervisor’ – how it is legally 
conceived and practically treated in Australia? That is, what legal regulation exists for boarding 
supervisors, and how does this reconcile with the employment practices used by some schools. If it 
does not reconcile, can this difference be explained by the application of other legal principles? 
 
Where appropriate, ‘School X’ (name withheld) will be used as an example. School X may not be 
representative of the entire industry, but merely provides one view on the employment of boarding 
supervisors. School X is located in Queensland, Australia, and hence this paper refers in places to 
Queensland industrial law, however, the issues remain valid for other jurisdictions. 
 
 
II  Supervisor demographics 
 
A  Occupation 
 
It is appropriate to give some background on the type of people who are engaged as boarding 
supervisors. Their backgrounds can be wide and varied. Some boarding supervisors may work as 
classroom teachers in the school, and hence be closely connected to the full range of school activities. 
 
However, not all supervisors are drawn from the teaching staff. Depending on the individual school’s 
hiring policy, there will often be boarding supervisors who are not employed in a teaching capacity. 
They may be employed by the school in other capacities, such as in the sporting program as a coach, 
or other support areas of the school.  
 
In yet a further category, it is possible that a supervisor’s sole association with the school will be 
through the boarding program. The supervisor would usually have another ‘primary occupation’, 
whether that is as a tertiary student, or as a teacher at another school, or as an employee in a different 
field entirely.  
 
Even where the supervisor is also employed as a teacher at the school, their teaching role would 
outweigh the time spent supervising in the boarding house, and a teacher could usually choose to 
leave the boarding role without it jeopardising their ongoing teaching position. The important point 
here is that for the majority of boarding supervisors
5
, their boarding work is secondary to their main 
occupation. 
 
 
B  Remuneration 
 
Again, like the hiring policy of a school, the remuneration offered to supervisors can vary greatly 
between schools. At one end of the spectrum, a school may pay their supervisors a monetary wage. In 
these cases, it is clear what benefits the supervisor is to receive and presumably, what their obligations 
are in return for that set wage. Given this certainty of obligations, both the school and the supervisor 
may find it easier to take action to enforce their rights, should the situation arise. 
 
However, in many cases, the remuneration given to supervisors for their services is non-monetary – 
this is the case for school teacher and non-teacher supervisors alike. Many schools choose to reward 
their supervisors by providing accommodation and meals. This presumably suits supervisors because 
the boarding work often involves late nights, which makes the availability of nearby accommodation 
attractive, and working a ‘second job’ is obviously time consuming, which makes completing normal 
household tasks such as cooking more difficult. Other benefits such as cleaning, laundry services and 
access to school facilities may also be provided. 
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In light of all above-mentioned characteristics of boarding supervision, it is necessary to examine the 
way in which the employment of such supervisors is regulated, as well as the actual practices that 
occur in some schools. 
 
 
III  Regulation of Boarding Supervisor Employment 
 
A  Award level 
 
Because most boarding houses in Australia are part of non-government schools, most supervisors
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will be covered under the Federal Educational Services (Schools) General Staff Award 2010 (‘the 
Award’).7 The small number of government school boarding supervisors may come under a state 
Award (except in Victoria where the Federal system applies).
8
 The situation with Grammar schools, 
which can be established under state legislation, may differ from state to state – in Queensland, they 
are not considered to be public sector employers and hence come under the Federal system.
9
 
 
The Award states that it “covers employers in the school education industry throughout Australia and 
their employees” (emphasis added).10  
 
The term ‘general employee’ is defined in the Award as including someone: 
 
[W]ho provides boarding supervision services - being an employee whose principal duties are 
to support the operation of a school's boarding house in relation to the supervision of 
students.
11
 
 
It does not apply to ‘day school’ teachers when they are engaged in their teaching role, although it 
does apply to a teacher providing boarding supervision duties (which are outside of regular teaching 
hours).
12
 
 
Therefore this award provides a minimum level of entitlements to boarding supervisors in most 
Australian schools – provided they are considered to be ‘employees’ (the legal implications of this 
term will be discussed below). 
 
The award goes on to detail minimum wages to be payable to boarding staff.
13
 However, the Award 
only deals with monetary remuneration and makes no mention of payment solely in the form of 
accommodation and meals. 
 
The Award may be varied by mutual agreement, but only in relation to certain matters, being: 
(a) arrangements for when work is performed; 
(b) overtime rates; 
(c) penalty rates; 
(d) allowances; and 
(e) leave loading.
14
 
 
There is no mention of the method of remuneration being able to be varied. Given that non-monetary 
remuneration is a method used in many boarding schools, it raises the question as to how boarding 
supervisors are actually being employed, under what instrument, and whether they are aware of their 
rights. A collective agreement is another instrument that may govern the employment of a boarding 
supervisor, provided that it raises the employment standards above the award level. 
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B  Collective Agreement level 
 
Beyond an award, a collective or enterprise agreement between an employer or group of employers, 
and employee representatives may provide additional rights to boarding supervisors. Clearly, such 
agreements will not be uniform in their provisions, and it is outside the scope of this article to 
consider all relevant agreements in all Australian schools. 
 
As an example, School X is currently a party to an Enterprise Bargaining Agreement, however, 
boarding supervisors are not covered by it. Other parties, including teachers, groundskeepers, 
cleaners, catering staff, nurses, security guards and bus drivers (many of whom have incidental roles 
to play in a boarding environment) are covered. 
 
On limited occasions in School X, boarding supervisors were approached to take on additional paid 
duties involving supervising children (not just boarding students) who were given Saturday 
detentions. For this role, supervisors were required to complete an Employment Declaration (for 
taxation purposes) and a Superannuation form, in order to formalise the appointment – despite it being 
a potential one-off occasion involving a very small number of children. No such forms were required 
by School X for the boarding supervision role. 
 
 
C  Individual contracts 
 
Given that the above-mentioned Award provides a minimum basis for boarding supervisors but it 
does not accurately reflect the reality of remuneration, and no collective agreement applies (in the 
case of School X), how does an agreement between a school and its supervisors avoid the award? 
Since the demise of ‘Australian Workplace Agreements’, individual contracts cannot be used to 
reduce the protections given under an award or the National Employment Standards which are 
contained in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).
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So, if the award does not seem to reflect the reality of boarding employment, and not all supervisors 
are covered by collective agreements, and individual contracts cannot undermine award rights, what 
classification can be given to the relationship between such a supervisor and their school? It leaves 
two possibilities for employers seeking to avoid the operation of an award – one, to hire independent 
contractors rather than ‘employees’, or (potentially) two, to argue that no contract exists at all. 
These will be dealt with below. 
 
 
IV  Is a boarding supervisor an employee? 
 
A  Legislative definitions regarding employees 
 
The applicable legislation that defines an ‘employee’ depends on whether a school is run by a State 
government or a private provider. 
 
For example, state schools in Queensland come under the application of the Industrial Relations Act 
1995 (Qld). That Act defines ‘employee’ to include: 
  
 (a) a person employed in a calling on wages or piecework rates; or 
(b) a person whose usual occupation is that of an employee in a calling;...
16
 
 
The definition of a ‘calling’ is “a craft, manufacture, occupation, trade, undertaking or vocation”.17 
These words are not defined by the Act.  
 
As stated earlier, private schools are likely to fall within the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), as application 
extends to “national system employees”18 (for example, employees of constitutional corporations).19 
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That Act defines ‘employee’ in each Part of the Act, as either a ‘national system employee’ or as 
having its ‘ordinary meaning’.20 
 
The important point to note is that, regardless of which Act applies to which school, case law will be 
required in order to interpret the meaning of the word ‘employee’. 
 
 
B  Case law on employees vs. contractors 
 
As stated earlier, the Award protections apply to persons who work under a contract of employment. 
This can be distinguished from people who conduct their own business as an independent contractor. 
This dichotomy is sometimes expressed as a ‘contract of service’ (employee) versus ‘a contract for 
services’ (contractor). 
 
Two leading Australian cases in the area are Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Ltd
21
 and Hollis v 
Vabu Pty Ltd
22
, both from the High Court. 
 
In Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling, a sawmill company engaged three categories of persons to get logs 
to their mill: fellers (who cut the trees), sniggers (who dragged the logs with tractors onto trucks) and 
drivers (who transported the logs to the mill). A truck driver was injured through the negligent act of a 
snigger, and the question was whether the snigger was an employee of the sawmill, making the 
sawmill vicariously liable. 
 
The High Court held that the snigger was not an employee but a contractor. In doing so, they 
examined various ‘indicia’ relevant to employment, additional to the traditional notion of ‘control of 
the employer’, including:  
 
the mode of remuneration, the provision and maintenance of equipment, the obligation to 
work, the hours of work and provision for holidays, the deduction of income tax and the 
delegation of work by the putative employee.
23
 
 
In the second case, Hollis v Vabu, a bicycle courier knocked down and injured a member of the 
public. The courier was not able to be individually identified, but the company he worked for was 
identified on his jacket. The question of vicarious liability again arose, which depended on whether 
the courier was an employee or contractor. 
 
Again, the High Court used various indicia to determine the matter. A relevant point was that the 
courier was required to make a capital outlay of his own (the bicycle) – a factor that points towards a 
contractor; however this was a relatively small expense. When compared to the indicia that pointed 
towards employment, such as the requirement to wear company livery (uniform), the courier being 
unable to dictate rostered working times, nor able to refuse work, the courier being required to follow 
company directives regarding personal appearance and manner of delivery, and the fairly low-skilled 
labour required,
24
 it led the majority of the High Court to find in favour of employment. This was 
despite the fact that the contract signed by the parties was headed “contract for service”.25 
 
It was stated by the majority that, “viewed as a practical matter, the bicycle couriers were not running 
their own business or enterprise, nor did they have independence in the conduct of their operations.”26 
 
And further: 
 
It was not the case that the couriers supplemented or performed part of the work undertaken 
by Vabu or aided from time to time; rather...to its customers they were Vabu and effectively 
performed all of Vabu’s operations in the outside world. It would be unrealistic to describe 
the couriers other than employees.
27
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It is clear that the court took a common sense view of the totality of the relationship in deciding the 
couriers had a contract of employment. 
 
 
C  Application to a boarding context 
 
The question must be asked whether the relevant indicia favour the relationship of employer-
employee or principal-contractor in relation to boarding supervisors. 
 
First, similar to Hollis v Vabu, boarding supervisors generally do not provide skilled labour, or require 
special qualifications. As stated in Part II above, boarding supervisors are often drawn from a wide 
range of fields, and while a background in teaching or other child-related industries might be 
desirable, it is not necessary. Often past pupils who are studying at university are considered for the 
role. 
 
Second, boarding supervisors have little control over hours. To use School X as an example, 
supervisors were rostered on to specific times each week, and were required to adhere to those times, 
unless a swap could be arranged with another supervisor and a member of the boarding management 
team notified of this. The work was not able to be completed at the convenience of the supervisor nor 
delegated to an outsider. This clearly favours employment. 
 
Third, boarding supervisors may be required to wear school livery. Many schools provide supervisors 
with shirts or other uniforms with the school logo, and at School X, such shirts were required to be 
worn when on a shift. 
 
Fourth, the mode of remuneration and any control over amounts deducted from pay, points against 
employment. Many boarding supervisors are not paid any money, and hence no amounts are deducted 
for tax purposes. This mode of remuneration (food and accommodation) is not described in the 
Award. However, it should equally be noted that this mode of remuneration does not necessarily point 
to a contractor relationship either. Along the same lines is the question of leave entitlements. A 
boarding supervisor may not receive specific leave entitlements, however, they are usually allowed to 
reside in their accommodation during school holiday periods when their services are not required – 
this may be interpreted as a form of leave entitlement. 
 
Fifth, a boarding supervisor does not have to provide their own tools or equipment. This points more 
towards employment, although it is not a particularly relevant indicium given the nature of the work. 
 
Sixth, the concept of control can be considered. Control in this sense means not just the exercise of 
actual control, but the ability to do so. For some parts of a supervisor’s role, there can be discretion 
for the individual supervisor to carry out their tasks the way they best see fit, for example, they may 
be required to run activities which they think will be of interest to the children. However, there is still 
considerable scope for actual control by management, and this often occurs. For example, a boarding 
supervisor may be instructed to mange behaviour according to certain policies, to report certain acts, 
or to be present in specific places for supervision. In School X, meetings were held whereby 
instructions were given to supervisors or new procedures explained. This points towards employment. 
 
Seventh, the High Court in Hollis v Vabu referred to the policy benefit of deterrence – that is, by 
making an employer vicariously liable, it is likely to result in better organisation and supervision from 
the employer. This is definitely relevant in a boarding environment. The risk of harm to children in 
schools generally should be a policy consideration, and more so in a residential setting such as a 
boarding school. There have in the past been too many cases of alleged abuse of boarding children, 
and claims that managers turned a blind eye. There would be clear policy grounds to consider schools 
as employers of boarding supervisors because of the deterrent effect. 
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A boarding supervisor, like the bicycle courier, cannot be considered to be running their own 
business. They cannot realistically work for more than one boarding school (without having to 
maintain multiple living environments). While most supervisors have other occupations in addition to 
the boarding work, this should be seen in the same light as any other person who works two jobs in 
order to increase personal profit. So whilst they can work in other industries, using different skills, 
they cannot use their supervision services to “build goodwill”28 in their name at multiple boarding 
schools. 
 
In addition to the indicia set out in these cases, other facts that would be relevant in some schools 
include boarding supervisors being given login credentials for the school computer system, being 
required to write reports for inclusion in the report cards sent home to parents and being issued keys 
to the premises. All of these, it is contended, point towards an employment relationship. 
 
It is argued that, provided a contract exists, such a contract would be one of employment. This is 
despite the lack of wages, which, it is conceded, is an indicium which would hold some weight 
against that conclusion. The totality of the relationship though must logically be one of employment 
rather than that of a contractor. 
 
 
D  A case on the issue of supervisor ‘employment’? 
 
It should be pointed out that there is a case example which might lead boarding schools, at least in 
Queensland, to believe that boarding supervisors are not employees. In 1996, the Queensland 
Industrial Relations Commission heard the case of Yabsley v Board of Trustees of the Ipswich 
Grammar School
29
 (the ‘Yabsley case’). That case involved a boarding supervisor seeking re-
instatement after claiming he was unfairly dismissed. Whether or not the relevant legislation applied 
turned on whether Yabsley was an employee. Yabsley’s arrangements with the school were fairly 
typical of boarding supervisors, as he received food and accommodation in return for 10 hours a week 
of services. 
 
The Headmaster of the school described the rewards given to Yabsley as an ‘honorarium’.30 The 
Commissioner placed much weight on this particular description, although it is unclear why the 
subjective classification by one party should be relied on so heavily. He examined the dictionary 
meaning of the word, as well as a Canadian case which described it in this way: 
 
[W]hile the money…is a compensation for services rendered, it is nevertheless not a payment 
for which the recipient, if not paid, could sue in a court of law. It is thus in the nature of an ex 
gratia or gratuitous payment, unlike a salary or wage or other contract remuneration.
31
 
 
The Commissioner goes on to address the test from Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co. He states the 
legal principles correctly but, it is respectfully argued, misapplied them to the facts of the case. The 
test regarding ‘control’ was rightly explained as being more than actual supervision by management, 
but whether supervision is possible. However, the Commissioner then goes on to say that there was 
little or no supervision of Yabsley in his role, “although it was clear that he [Yabsley] was expected to 
be available at certain times”.32 The Commissioner did not seem to consider the ability of the Ipswich 
Grammar School to exercise control. 
 
The lack of wages was also important to the Commissioner: 
 
[H]e [Mr Yabsley] simply received certain benefits in return for the performance of his tasks. 
There were no provisions for holidays. There was no income tax involved – although the 
employer was required to pay FBT in respect of the meals provided.
33
 
 
The Commissioner concluded that Mr Yabsley was not an employee of Ipswich Grammar School, and 
he could not sue for unfair dismissal. However, there are some important facts that bear heavily on the 
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reliability of this case, and which may be used to distinguish it from current relationships with 
boarding supervisors. 
 
The first is that this case was determined before Hollis v Vabu. While that case may not have greatly 
changed the test set down in Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co, it did provide a different application 
– one where the person in fact labelled a ‘contractor’ was found in law to be an ‘employee’. Also, a 
wider range of indicia were used in Hollis v Vabu. The availability of such a precedent may have led 
the Commissioner to a different conclusion.  
 
The second issue with the judgement is that the Commissioner failed to classify the relationship. If it 
was not an employment contract, what type of contract was it? Granted, this was not the task required 
of the Commissioner, rather it was to determine whether Yabsley was an employee, to which he 
answered in the negative. But Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co., and later Hollis v Vabu, looked at 
the issue as being either a contract of service or a contract for services. The Commissioner does not 
fully examine the consequences of denying the employment relationship. Is it really possible that Mr 
Yabsley was an independent contractor, engaged in his own business? With the benefit of the Hollis v 
Vabu decision, this conclusion seems highly unlikely, as argued above. 
 
The third point to note is that when the Yabsley case was heard, no Award applied to boarding 
supervisors. In an earlier hearing, where the school had made an unsuccessful application to strike out 
the proceedings, the Commissioner stated, “it is clear that no award covers the nature of the duties 
performed by Mr Yabsley and that he is award free.”34 
 
However, as stated in Part III above, this is no longer the case. The Educational Services (General 
Staff) Award 2010 specifically applies to boarding supervisors. This clearly demonstrates that they are 
at least capable of being employees.  
 
The Yabsley case should be of little relevance in examining the relationship between school and 
boarding supervisor in the current day. Boarding supervisors meet enough criteria to be considered 
employees. Whether this is in fact the case though, will still depend on whether there is a contract 
entered into between the parties. 
 
 
V  Is there a contract at all? Intention to create legal relations: employees and 
volunteers 
 
The second possible argument a school might advance to avoid the Award is that there is no contract 
at all – that is, there is neither a contract of service, nor a contract for services. 
 
This is potentially the approach taken by School X. A ‘letter of appointment’ was provided by School 
X to boarding supervisors at the end of a school year, relating to positions on offer for the following 
year. The letter specified the requirements of the role, as well as the remuneration of food and 
accommodation. However, of particular interest to the boarding supervisors was the repeated use of 
the word ‘volunteer’ in the letter.  
 
The term ‘volunteer’ seems to connote a role for the boarding supervisor that is somewhat different to 
that of ‘employee’. The question of boarding supervisors as volunteers (or more generally, other 
people engaged in voluntary roles in a school) leads to further questions regarding their legal status. 
Does the classification of ‘volunteer’ mean that the relationship formed between the school and the 
boarding supervisor is not a contractual one? Does such an agreement lack contractual intention? 
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A  Case law on intention to create legal relations 
 
One possible construction of the ‘volunteer’ classification is that the agreement may lack an intention 
to create legal relations, which is required to form a contract. It may be argued that boarding 
supervisors are analogous to ‘live-in nannies’ or (even worse) a teenager who undertakes to babysit 
their siblings in order to earn some pocket money – perhaps traditionally described as ‘a social or 
domestic relationship’. 
 
It should be noted that the correct approach to determining ‘intention’ in Australia is provided by 
Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community
35
 (the ‘Ermogenous case’). This case reinforced that, like 
all other elements of contract formation, intention was to be determined objectively and proven by the 
person alleging the contract exists. 
 
Even if a more ‘traditional’ approach were followed, involving the classification of agreements as 
either social/domestic or commercial, and then imputing certain presumptions because of this, the 
burden of rebutting the social/domestic presumption was not a particularly difficult task as shown by 
the case law in the area.
36
 
 
The easiest way to show that parties did not intend the creation of legal obligations is to state that fact 
very clearly in the agreement (often termed an ‘honour clause’). But the issue becomes more difficult 
when a term like ‘volunteer’ is used. Does a ‘volunteer’ agreement (or other similar terms) provide 
objective evidence that the parties did not intend to create legal relations? A starting point might be 
the case of Teen Ranch Pty Ltd v Brown
37
 (the ‘Teen Ranch case’).  
 
In that case, Teen Ranch ran a Christian camping facility in New South Wales. During the school 
holidays, they provided holiday programmes for teenagers, described as a mixture of recreational and 
Christian activities. To cater for the many teenagers that participated in any given camp, Teen Ranch 
had a small number of permanent staff, which they supplemented with volunteer staff drawn from a 
pool of about 150 teachers and university students.
 38
 
 
Mr Brown had been a part of this volunteer staff pool for about eight years and had worked on a 
number of camps, starting initially as a kitchen hand but progressing to a ‘rouseabout’ and then a 
small group leader responsible for running activities. The agreement between Brown and Teen Ranch 
was informal, but it was understood by Handley J to provide Brown with free food and 
accommodation: 
 
Mr Eastment [a director of Teen Ranch] said: ‘If you work here you’ll get a place to sleep and 
your meals and it won’t cost you anything’. I infer from this conversation that teenagers paid 
to attend the camp but that payment was waived for volunteer staff.
39
 
 
Brown was injured whilst horse riding at a camp in 1990. He claimed compensation under the 
Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), and was awarded $5,433 by O’Toole CCJ. Teen Ranch 
appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal, on the grounds that Brown was not an employee. The 
decision would turn on “the characterisation of the arrangement made”40 – the point of dispute 
between the parties. 
 
Brown conceded in cross-examination that his motivation for attending the camps was more than to 
receive the free food and accommodation. It was “to extend [his] Christian involvement”, “part of 
[his] involvement with Christian youth” and “part of an activity [he] enjoyed”.41 He had not intended 
to create legal relations, and Teen Ranch was ultimately successful in their appeal. 
 
Handley J had characterised the agreement, to use the now somewhat-out-of-favour language, as 
being in the category of “family, social or domestic arrangements [which] do not normally give rise to 
binding contracts because the parties lack the necessary intention”.42 
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However, just two months after the Teen Ranch case, the case of Harris v Cudgegong Soaring Pty 
Ltd
43
 (the ‘Cudgegong case’) was heard. In that case, Mr Harris was one of a group of people involved 
on the committee of a Gliding club. He was qualified and appointed as that club’s Chief Flying 
Instructor. The club decided to move its operations to a more favourable rural location. Some 
permanent structures were built. Club members and visitors were permitted to temporarily camp on 
the property. 
 
Harris fell upon hard times, and lost his business and his home. He gained permission to permanently 
live in his caravan at the club’s airfield. Some permanent structures were built to facilitate this. He 
was the only member with such permission. In return, Mr Harris was to act as caretaker, to help 
prevent vandalism, perform maintenance and allow the airfield to be used midweek if needed. He did 
not pay rent. 
 
Harris was injured when a glider which he was testing in his role as Chief Flying Instructor crashed to 
the ground. He was left a partial paraplegic. The issue arose as the whether he was employed by the 
club, however a preliminary issue to be determined was whether there had been intention to create 
legal relations when the agreement between Harris and the club was made. 
 
Neilson J of the Compensation Court of NSW found that that had been the requisite intention. It was 
relevant that after falling upon hard times: 
 
The applicant [Harris] was bereft of one of the necessities of life: shelter. True it is that he had 
a caravan and temporary annex on site but this would hardly be suitable for a permanent 
residence, as anyone who has spent any time in such a structure would know and as the 
“permanent residents” section of any caravan park also shows. He wanted a position in a 
more favourable area…which…provided privacy. He also wanted security of tenure….To 
secure that favoured position and security he made an offer – his services as a caretaker. I 
would not categorise his offering his service to obtain a basic human necessity as being a 
social arrangement.
44
 [Emphasis added] 
 
This case clearly shows the importance of obtaining secure living arrangements, even when the 
agreement for such arrangements does not include the payment of rent but rather the provision of 
services. The judge distinguished the Teen Ranch case on the basis that Harris’ work was: 
 
Not done “to do something of a practical Christian nature” but was done to secure a necessity 
of life: shelter.
45
 
 
While it is not doubted that, in these two instances, the correct outcome was reached in classing 
Brown as a volunteer with merely moral obligations, and Harris as an employee in a properly formed 
contract, it is important to realise that these cases do not mean that a religious or other altruistic 
motivation for doing work could not also give rise to employment. The Ermogenous case
46
 
specifically makes that point.  
 
In that case, Spyridon Ermogenous had served as an Archbishop in the Greek Orthodox tradition for 
23 years. Upon retirement, he claimed payment was due to him for annual leave and long service 
leave. An Industrial Magistrate agreed and awarded damages.
47
 
 
The Industrial Magistrate’s decision (subsequently affirmed by two unsuccessful appeals of the Greek 
Orthodox Community to the Industrial Relations Court of South Australia, and then to the Full Court 
of that court) had examined the agreement between the Community and the Archbishop and 
determined that it was a contract of employment. Ample evidence was led to prove this, including the 
Community recruiting Ermogenous from the US, their requirement that he follow their direction in 
almost all matters, and the method used for accounting for his stipend and PAYE tax deductions. The 
actual existence of a contract was somewhat assumed, and these courts focused on the type of contract 
it would be – a contract of employment. 
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The Greek Orthodox Community was able to appeal a third time, to the Full Court of the Supreme 
Court of South Australia. The majority rightly pointed out that “intention to enter a contractual 
relationship about the remuneration and maintenance and support of a minister of religion is not to be 
presumed”.48 They believed that the Industrial Magistrate had not properly considered whether 
intention existed, and when they examined it, they believed it did not exist. 
 
Archbishop Ermogenous was then granted leave to appeal to the High Court, an event not too 
common in the relatively settled waters of contract law. The High Court reiterated the basic principles 
for contract formation, which included how to determine intention. They stated: 
 
not only is there difficulty in formulating rules intended to prescribe the kinds of cases in 
which an intention to create contractual relations should, or should not, be found to exist, it 
would be wrong to do so…[intention] requires an objective assessment of the state of 
affairs between the parties (as distinct from the identification of any uncommunicated 
subjective reservation or intention that either may harbour).
49
 [Emphasis added] 
 
The efficacy of the traditional ‘presumption’ approach was severely questioned by the High Court: 
 
we doubt the utility of using the language of presumptions in this context. At best, the use of 
that language does no more than invite attention to identifying the party who bears the onus of 
proof. In this case…there could be no doubt that it was for the appellant [Ermogenous] to 
demonstrate that there was such a contract. References to presumptions may only serve to 
distract from that more basic and important proposition.
50
 
 
There was a real possibility that such presumptions could:  
 
rapidly ossify into a rule of law, that there cannot be a contract of employment of a minister 
of religion, distorting the proper application of basic principles of the law of contract.
51
 
 
In deciding the case, the High Court noted that many of the previous cases were able to be 
distinguished on the facts. While some religious ministers owed duties to their particular church, 
diocese or bishop, these arose out of being appointed to canonical offices, not necessarily out of 
contract. Ermogenous was not holding such an office, but was recruited under an agreement with the 
respondent (whose operations were beyond just a church), and normal contract principles should 
apply. They found that the Industrial Magistrate has impliedly addressed the issue of intention, and 
that the Supreme Court was wrong to disturb his findings on the grounds that they did. The appeal 
was allowed and the matter remitted to the Supreme Court.
52
  
 
Finally, in Redeemer Baptist School Ltd v Glossop
53
 (the ‘Redeemer case’), a school was attempting 
to bring a defamation claim, but corporations were prevented from doing so under the relevant 
legislation, unless they employed less than 10 people. The school argued that it fell within this 
exception, as its staff were volunteers acting according to their Baptist ministry. 
 
The school was part of a religious community, and the staff were also members of the ‘ministry order’ 
of the Redeemer Baptist Church, which among other things, provided that members live in the 
housing designated by the community’s Elders of the Church, they perform tasks as designated by the 
Elders, and they renounce in principle any personal possession of property.
54
 
 
The school’s ‘Staff Manual’ specifically stated that any teacher who was a member of the ‘ministry 
order’ was not considered an employee, however they may receive a stipend to assist in their ministry. 
This stipend varied from teacher to teacher according to individual needs. Any teacher not a member 
of the religious community would be considered an employee and receive award entitlements.
55
 
Essentially the arrangements were structured so that the Church provided the staff, and the School 
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paid the Church for services rendered by the teachers.
56
 Members who did then receive stipends 
ordinarily had tax deducted from them. 
 
A number of teachers gave evidence that they had not contemplated a legal relationship arising with 
the school, and that they worked at the school as part of their Christian service. 
 
The issue for determination was whether a contract existed. The NSW Supreme Court held that the 
teachers were not employees because there was no intention to create legal relations and hence no 
contract: 
 
[T]he evidence negates the conclusion that they [the teachers] intended that their 
arrangements with the plaintiff [school] would place them under a legal obligation to provide 
services to the school. Rather, it demonstrates that their underlying arrangement with the 
plaintiff was with and through the Church, and that their intention was to effect a calling to 
serve God in accordance with the Ministry Order.
57
 
 
So at one end of the potential spectrum of intention, we have Brown being classed as a volunteer and 
the agreement lacking intention, and at the other end, Ermogenous and Harris being classed as 
employees because they were a party to a binding contract. The Redeemer case provides a view 
somewhere in between, where the teachers’ continuity of service is far more regular than in the Teen 
Ranch case, being closer to the full-time duties performed by Archbishop Ermogenous, yet the court 
still found that the service was done purely for religious reasons and lacked legal intention. 
 
 
B  Application to a Boarding Supervisor 
 
How do cases like those described above relate to a boarding environment? We need to examine the 
objective intention of the parties from their words and conduct.  
 
There are certain similarities between the case law examples and boarding supervisors, but also 
important distinctions. For instance, boarding supervisors are often rewarded for their services with 
free food and accommodation, whereas parents of boarding students must pay for this – this is similar 
to Mr Brown’s agreement with Teen Ranch. However, the provision of these rewards to Mr Brown 
were only for the duration of the camp, whereas for boarding supervisors, the accommodation 
provided is their primary place of residence – this is significant. As the Cudgegong case declared, 
agreeing to perform services in order to gain a place in which to live seems to be a relatively serious 
matter, one argued to objectively indicate intention to create legal relations. 
 
Second, boarding supervisors usually have another occupation distinct from working in the boarding 
house. Mr Brown also did not work full-time at the Teen Ranch. However, the work of a boarding 
supervisor is far more structured. Mr Brown was part of a pool of potential workers, and there was no 
obligation on him to attend a camp. A boarding supervisor though must perform their allocated shifts 
or be required to move out of the accommodation. There is an ongoing obligation each week for the 
supervisor to provide their services; they do not have the choice to opt out and opt back in again. 
Again, this points away from boarding supervisors being mere volunteers. 
 
Third, the Teen Ranch was established primarily for religious purposes. Boarding schools, like 
schools in general, still retain some aspects of the ‘vocation’ of education, notwithstanding the 
potentially high fees charged by them. Schools are still not-for-profit organisations, like the Teen 
Ranch or the Redeemer Baptist School. For instance, the teachers at Redeemer Baptist School worked 
full-time and were still classed as volunteers. However, this was due to fairly unique circumstances 
whereby it was understood by all involved that the work was part of the teachers’ religious 
observance. This would not apply to the vast majority of boarding supervisors (or teachers for that 
matter), even in schools run by religious orders or dioceses. It is doubtful that many (or any) boarding 
supervisor would perform the work if they were not to be rewarded – and if there were any such 
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supervisors, their intentions would need to be very clearly expressed and understood. Using the term 
‘volunteer’ to describe a boarding supervisor does not, it is argued, equate to the objective certainty 
found in the Redeemer case. 
 
Fourth, like Mr Brown’s time at the Ranch, it is possible that many boarding supervisors “enjoy their 
work”,58 that is, they perform it because they want to. The environment is not suited to someone who 
dislikes working with children and teenagers, but rather to someone who must be willing to look 
beyond certain immature behaviours in order to help the student adjust to life away from their home, 
and help them develop into the best adult they can be. Having said that, the environment can involve 
very stressful situations for supervisors – as any parent raising teenagers would likely attest to. If a 
boarding supervisor lost enjoyment for the work, they would undoubtedly seek to leave, particularly 
those with other primary occupations. But how is this different to any other form of employment? It is 
not a criterion for employment that one must hate their job. The mere fact of enjoying the communal 
aspect of a boarding environment does not equate to volunteering to be there, and the mere use of the 
term ‘volunteer’ does not negate a boarding supervisor’s expectation to be rewarded for their work. 
 
In fact, the term ‘volunteer’ is vague – it could be referring to the choice a supervisor makes to do the 
work, and that they may leave if they don’t find the work to their liking. Again though, the same 
could be said about any work environment. School X described the intent behind the volunteer term as 
“it’s a voluntary position – you either want to do it or you don’t”. This explanation does not seem to 
clearly convey to a supervisor that it might also mean the agreement could lack legal effect. The term 
‘volunteer’ can be interpreted differently, and therefore is a poor way of trying to implement an 
honour clause. 
 
Finally, it is important to note the findings of the Hollis v Vabu case (discussed earlier) when 
considering a document such as that provided by School X to its boarding supervisors. While the 
expressed intention of one party (such as School X) may be relevant as a factor, it is not 
determinative, particularly in the case where such intentions are to be expressed in a ‘take it or leave 
it’ fashion. So, while such a document may purport to engage boarding supervisors as volunteers, a 
court would look at the objective circumstances of the agreement. It is argued that given the 
seriousness involved for a potential supervisor in moving into a new residence (especially with the 
potential limited availability of properties for rent in the capital cities if they were required to leave), 
the seriousness involved in a boarding supervisor acting in place of a child’s parents, and the 
expectation by schools, parents and children that professional supervision would be provided, then 
objectively this agreement should be one that any reasonable person would expect to be legally 
enforceable by either party. 
 
A final point regarding intention – the criticisms of the Yabsley case mentioned in Part IV (D) above 
could also be raised here. In the earlier hearing, the Commissioner stated that he believed there was 
“an intention to create legal relationships”,59 but that this was (rightly) distinct from the question of 
employment. However, by the second hearing, he placed weight on Mr Yabsley’s rewards being an 
‘honorarium’ and not enforceable.60 Whilst it is acknowledged that the first hearing was only a 
preliminary one to answer an application to strike out, there is a notable inconsistency between the 
two. If there is truly intention in that case, then recovery of the valuable consideration of the contract 
(be it money, or food and accommodation) must be actionable in a court of law, and therefore it is not 
an honorarium according to his definition. If, instead, there is no intention, then the references to the 
Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co. indicia in the second judgement are redundant because there is no 
contract to begin with. This is another reason why the Yabsley case does not provide clear guidance 
on the legal status of boarding supervisors and should not be followed. 
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VI  Conclusions and Implications 
 
The issue of boarding supervisor employment is quite unclear, at least in schools like School X where 
non-monetary remuneration is provided. Whilst an award does exist to cover boarding supervisors, 
this is ostensibly not followed by a number of boarding schools who do not make monetary payments 
to their staff. This may be because they have a more beneficial provision in an enterprise agreement. 
Or rather, it could be that they do not consider the contract with their boarding supervisors to be one 
of employment, or that they don’t consider the agreement to be a contract at all. 
 
This raises serious implications, not the least for the boarding supervisors who may not be aware of 
their legal rights. While it is outside the scope of this paper, a lack of employment status may have 
implications for accessing statutory workers compensation schemes – a major issue if an injury 
arising from the boarding job affects the supervisor’s ability to work in their primary occupation. It 
also raises questions about vicarious liability for a boarding supervisor’s negligence, although it 
should be noted that the duty of care of a school authority to their children is non-delegable.
61
 
Undoubtedly there are also superannuation and taxation considerations at stake for a school should a 
supervisor be an employee. 
 
But wider than that, it implies a lack of professionalism in the role of a boarding supervisor – a role 
which is arguably a relevant factor in the achievement of positive educational and pastoral outcomes 
for boarding students. 
 
The schools which still reward supervisors with non-monetary remuneration should make it clear to 
their staff that they are making an agreement outside the bounds of legal enforcement (and why this 
needs to be the case). Alternatively (and preferably), the Award needs to be modified to reflect the 
reality of non-monetary remuneration. 
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